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Boundary Spanning and Gatekeeping Roles of UK Audit 
Committees
ABSTRACT 
Post financial crisis, audit committee (AC) reforms are proposed to improve the 
quality of financial reporting (EC 2011; Competition Commission 2013).  This 
paper’s empirical contribution is to investigate the extent to which ACs and audit 
committee chairs (ACCs) engage with chief financial officers (CFOs) and audit 
partners (APs) across a range of 32 financial reporting issues. It is the first large-scale 
survey of interactions to move beyond the micro CFO / AP dyad and to distinguish 
the individual ACC from the AC group. While 37% of the 5,445 reported interactions 
involve all three key individuals together with the full AC, 35% involve neither the 
AC nor the ACC and the ACC acts without the full AC in a significant minority of 
cases. The parties reported to be involved are similar across the three respondent 
groups but vary with financial reporting issue, company size and audit firm size. The 
paper’s theoretical contribution is to interpret the evidence using the concepts of 
boundary spanning and gatekeeping roles. The research reveals incomplete levels of 
AC and ACC engagement with financial reporting issues.  Findings have implications 
for policymakers regarding the role, influence and effectiveness of the AC in financial 
reporting matters. Directions for future research are identified. 
Keywords: auditor-client interaction; audit committee; boundary spanner; corporate 
governance; discussion; negotiation.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Following the banking crisis, regulatory reforms relating to corporate governance, 
financial reporting and the role of auditors are currently being considered in various 
national and supranational jurisdictions.  In relation specifically to audit committees 
(ACs), the EC is proposing a regulation to mandate engagement by auditors with audit 
committees (ACs) in EU public interest entities regarding audit and financial reporting 
issues (EC 2011, para. 23). In the UK, the Competition Commission, in its statutory 
investigation of the audit market, concluded that the accountability of the external 
auditor to the AC should be strengthened as one of seven remedies for the adverse effect 
of high concentration on competition (Competition Commission 2013, pp. 265-274).  
Further, the UK Corporate Governance Code contains a new requirement (to come into 
effect in late 2013) for AC reports to give a description of significant issues considered 
by the AC in relation to the financial statements and how these issues were addressed 
(FRC 2012). These reforms all focus on the engagement of the AC as a means to 
improve the quality of financial reporting. 
In recent years, a major influence on AC regimes in many countries was the passing of 
the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 which instituted mandatory reforms 
designed to restore confidence in US corporate governance, financial reporting and 
auditing after the Enron scandal and the collapse of Andersen. SOX provisions impacted 
on entities beyond the US since they also applied to foreign subsidiaries and foreign 
registrants with US listings and came to be viewed as best practice.  A key feature of 
SOX was to mandate the strengthening of the role of the AC in its engagement with 
auditors in financial reporting and auditing issues and also to mandate the engagement 
of auditors with the AC.  The influence of SOX led to changes in AC regimes 
throughout the EU and particularly in the UK (Smith Committee 2003).  
2Comparative studies of AC practices in the EU suggest that there are significant 
differences in AC regimes, particularly between what is referred to as the Anglo-Saxon 
market-based governance model and the continental European / Japanese insider 
stakeholder model (Collier and Zaman 2005, Cicon et al. 2012). The market-based 
approach is short-term and shareholder-centric, whereas the insider stakeholder model 
adopts a longer-term view and is responsive to diverse interests and accountabilities 
(García-Castro et al. 2013). Some evidence is emerging within the EU of a move 
towards the Anglo-Saxon US / UK style regime for ACs; a model which draws mainly 
on the US model (Kumar and Zattoni 2013). However the extent of the adoption of the 
Anglo-Saxon model varies significantly between EU countries (Coffee 2006, Oxley 
2007, Quick et al. 2007).   
The mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for the 
group accounts of all EU listed companies from 2005 resulted in a more technically 
complex accounting regime for listed companies, placing considerable strain on ACs, 
audit committee chairs (ACCs), chief financial officers (CFOs) and audit partners (APs) 
(Beattie et al. 2011, ch.16). It is now widely recognised that the engagement of the AC 
with the financial reporting and auditing process has changed (e.g. Sabia and 
Goodfellow 2005, KPMG 2006, 2010, 2013). ACs have emerged as a key influence in 
the financial reporting process, although there has been relatively little research about 
the actual level of engagement between the key parties. While small-sample case studies 
have been carried out in the UK by Turley and Zaman (2007) and Beattie et al. (2011), 
in Canada by Gendron and Bédard (2006) and in Malaysia by Salleh and Stewart (2012), 
to date there has been no large-scale study of AC engagement specifically regarding 
crucial financial reporting issues. This is particularly desirable given that Beattie et al. 
(2012) investigated the level of involvement of key parties in relation to a range of 
audit-related issues and found evidence of less than full AC engagement. 
In their review of auditor-client interaction research, Nelson and Tan (2005, p.58) call 
for research that recognises that practice has changed ‘to involve audit committees and 
various forms of regulatory oversight to a greater extent’.  This paper responds to this 
call by undertaking a wide ranging experiential questionnaire survey of the three 
principal parties in the financial reporting interaction process.  Previous questionnaire 
studies have focussed only on the micro CFO / AP dyad (see, for example, Beattie et al. 
3(2000) in the UK and Gibbins et al. (2007) in Canada). The present survey was 
conducted in the 2007 UK regulatory environment, which is fundamentally unchanged 
at the present time. 1  It complements the limited extant case study research on the CFO / 
AP / AC triad previously undertaken by providing large scale data suitable for statistical 
analysis and permitting generalisation.  The paper is situated at the juncture of the 
financial reporting interaction literature (which largely ignores the role of ACs) and the 
AC literature (which focusses on inputs and outputs and largely ignores process 
aspects).  
Our research questions concern the financial statement issues which are the subject of 
interaction between CFOs, APs and / or ACCs. AC engagement in these interactions is 
conceived as a two-stage process: awareness and involvement. Awareness is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for involvement. First, we explore the extent to 
which the ACCs’ level of awareness of financial reporting interaction issues (both 
generally and with respect to specific issues) is similar to the other two respondent 
groups (APs and CFOs).  Second, we examine the extent to which the ACC and the full 
AC are routinely involved in discussions related to the production of financial 
statements.  Finally, we investigate the extent to which factors such as financial 
reporting issue, company size and audit firm tier impact upon the engagement of the 
parties in the interactions.  
The primary empirical contribution of the paper is to provide the first large-sample 
evidence of the extent to which ACs are engaged in financial reporting issues in the 
post-SOX, Anglo-Saxon corporate governance environment. There are two important 
secondary empirical contributions: (i) the engagement of the ACC is considered 
separately from the full AC and (ii) contextual factors that may influence the extent of 
engagement are explored. Given the key role of ACs in proposed regulatory change, this 
evidence offers a valuable baseline for future academic research and policy-making. The 
theoretical contribution of the paper is to highlight the role of the ACC (and the AC) as 
boundary spanners and gatekeepers, constructs drawn from the organisational studies 
literature. To our knowledge, the only study to date to characterise the AC in this way is 
Seabright et al. (1992), who focus on the issue of auditor-client realignments. This paper 
will inform national and supranational regulators who are currently considering further 
changes to AC regimes in respect of AC engagement with financial reporting issues.  
4The extent of AC engagement in this core area of an AC’s remit provides new insights 
into a key aspect of AC effectiveness under the UK Anglo-Saxon style governance 
regime. Our findings respond to the growing call for evidence-based policy making that 
assesses the effects of financial regulation (e.g. Buijink 2006). 
Findings are based on questionnaire responses from 498 individuals (130 ACCs, 149 
CFOs and 219 APs) linked to UK listed companies.  The main findings are that, while 
37% of the 5,445 reported interactions involve all three key individuals together with the 
full AC, 35% involve neither the AC nor the ACC and the ACC acts without the full AC 
in a significant minority of cases. The parties reported to be involved are similar across 
the three respondent groups but vary with financial reporting issue; company and auditor 
firm size. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  The next section, the literature 
review, is in four sections. Section 2.1 briefly describes the development of the UK 
corporate governance framework; section 2.2 examines the impact of national 
differences on corporate governance regimes; section 2.3 sets out theoretical 
perspectives (in particular the boundary spanning and gatekeeping roles) of ACs and 
ACCs; and section 2.4 focuses on research into AC practices and behaviour and, in 
particular, the limited literature on the AC’s involvement in financial reporting 
interactions.  Section three develops research questions, section four discusses the 
methods used in the study, section five presents results and discussion, and section six 
summarises and concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Development of the UK corporate governance framework
The UK financial scandals (e.g. Maxwell and BCCI) of the early 1990s prompted the 
first formal corporate governance framework, the Cadbury Report (1992).  Regulatory 
reviews of this framework have since been undertaken regularly. The Smith Committee 
(2003), which was set up after the Enron scandal, made the principal recommendations 
about AC engagement with external auditors and financial reporting. Prior to the Smith 
Committee, which followed the passing of SOX in the US, the UK corporate governance 
code focussed primarily on improving the internal management of the company.   
5The entire system of business regulation in the UK is described as a ‘market-based 
approach’ which emphasises the company-shareholder relationship (FRC 2006a).  The 
Financial Conduct Authority, the market regulator, requires listed companies to provide 
a ‘comply or explain’ statement in their annual report which explains how the corporate 
governance code has been applied by the company.  In particular, an explanation is 
needed whenever the code’s recommendations are not followed (FRC 2006a, p.7, 
ICAEW 2006, p.18), an approach which differs radically from the mandatory 
requirements in SOX. The code provisions relevant to audit committees and financial 
reporting require the company board to establish an AC of at least 3 (or 2 for smaller 
companies) independent non-executive directors, at least one of whom has recent and 
relevant financial experience (FRC 2006b, §C3.1). The AC is expected to monitor the 
integrity of the financial statements of the company, reviewing significant financial 
reporting judgements contained in them and discuss with the auditor issues that have 
been resolved and those which are unresolved. Further changes introduced in the 2012 
revision require a description of the significant issues considered by the AC in the 
annual report (FRC 2012, §C.3.8).  These changes will begin to appear in late 2013. 
Thus, the significance and remit of the AC as a means of communicating with the 
external auditor about financial reporting and auditing matters has grown. The AC, as a 
sub-committee of the main board, remains subject to influence (power) from the main 
board. However, UK case study evidence suggests that the influence of either individual 
executive board members (particularly the CEO) or of the main board acting as a group 
has declined as corporate governance structures have strengthened (c.f. Beattie et al. 
2001 and Beattie Fearnley and Hines (hereafter BFH) 2011). In addition to formal 
reporting by the AC to the main board, informal messages and advice occur by means of 
board member attendance at AC meeting (as reported in BFH 2011, p.45). 
The UK auditing standard that governs communication between the auditor and those 
charged with governance2 (ISA (UK&I) 260, APB 2004, Turley 2007, p.218) mirrors 
the corporate governance code, requiring auditors to engage with the AC on financial 
reporting matters. ‘Comply or explain’ does not apply to UK auditors as compliance 
with auditing standards is mandatory. Auditors’ work is subject to independent 
inspection by the Financial Reporting Council’s Audit Inspection Unit, thus non-
compliance with ISA 260 (UK & I) by auditors can be exposed.  
6The change to IFRS in 2005 greatly increased the complexity of the financial statements 
and caused ACs, ACCs and CFOs to become more reliant on their auditors for technical 
support in dealing with IFRS (BFH 2011, pp.250-6). Because of the complexity of 
IFRS, the role of the AC and the ACC also became more important in monitoring the 
financial statements for the benefit of the company board.  
The EC proposals regarding ACs and financial reporting (EC 2011, article 31) require an 
AC to have one member with audit experience and one with experience in accounting or 
auditing. The AC should: monitor the financial reporting process and submit 
recommendations and proposals to ensure its integrity; monitor the statutory audit of the 
annual and consolidated financial statements; supervise the completeness and integrity 
of the draft audit reports; and monitor the effectiveness of the undertaking’s internal 
control, internal audit and risk management systems.  
2.2 Corporate governance under different country regimes 
Countries vary significantly in their economic and institutional context (La Porta et al.
2008). Leuz (2010) analyses the different approaches to financial regulation generally, 
identifying institutional country clusters covering 49 countries based on 13 institutional 
characteristics. He argues that global convergence is unlikely due to these institutional 
differences and enforcement differences. The comparative corporate governance 
literature recognises describes two key styles (or ideal types) of national governance: the 
short term, outsider market-driven shareholder value model (which is seen as the Anglo-
Saxon model and is becoming increasingly influential thorough globalisation of capital 
markets) and the continental European / Japanese model of a longer term, insider 
stakeholder-driven model (Clarke 2011).  The former model is characterised by deep 
equity markets, low employee protection and common law system, whereas the latter is 
typified by code law, greater emphasis on bank financing and employee rights (for a 
detailed discussion, see García-Castro et al. 2013, pp.392-3).  Recent evidence from 26 
European countries suggests that 25% of the variation in firm performance is attributable 
to country-level factors embedded in these corporate governance models, rather than 
firm-level factors (van Essen et al. 2013).
7There are currently pressures on both. The Anglo-Saxon model is under pressure to 
demonstrate more social responsibility and accountability and the European-Japanese 
model is under pressure to be more responsive to markets and more transparent.  Clarke 
(2011) also refers to the key differences in board structure.  Some countries such as UK 
have a unitary board consisting of executive and non-executive directors, while others, 
such as Germany, have supervisory boards involving a wider range of stakeholders. 
There are also differences between code law and common law countries. Davies and 
Schlitzer (2008) refer to the insider / outsider corporate governance system and conclude 
that a one size fits all approach to global governance is not necessarily the right 
approach.  
Collier and Zaman (2005) analyse the corporate governance codes in 20 European 
countries and conclude that the AC concept is widely accepted in countries with both 
unitary and two-tier governance systems, although there is considerable variation in the 
detailed recommendations covering structures and responsibilities.  The assumption of 
global convergence towards the common law system in the EU with its shareholder 
focussed governance has been questioned by Cicon et al. (2010). From a thematic 
analysis of governance codes in 23 EU countries, they find that some EU countries are 
diverging from the UK model. Böhm et al (2012) review the design of audit committees 
in six continental European countries following the amendment of EU Eighth Directive 
on Company Law and conclude that there are substantial cross-national differences.  
FEE (2012) finds a similar level of differences in a larger-scale study. It is however 
interesting that, following the financial crisis, the European Commission in a draft 
regulation (EC 2011, article 23) is recommending more engagement between the AC 
and the auditors in financial reporting matters, placing the responsibility on the auditors 
to report more extensively to the AC. This follows the UK model typical of the Anglo-
Saxon model. For this reason, evidence from the UK setting has wider relevance. 
2.3 Theoretical perspectives on the role of the audit committee – boundary spanning and 
gatekeeping
The role of the AC has generally been explained from the perspective of agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) and these ideas underpin corporate governance codes in the 
UK and elsewhere.  The AC plays a role in reducing agency costs by overseeing the 
effectiveness of management’s financial reporting policies (e.g. Haka and Chalos 1990).  
8However the generic governance literature (e.g. Barratt et al. 2002) has also identified 
non-executive directors as boundary spanners, a concept derived from resource 
dependency theory in which organisations reduce the level of environmental turbulence 
they face by co-opting the resources they need.  Hillman and Dalziel (2003) propose that 
corporate boards (including presumably their sub-committees) need to be viewed from 
both perspectives to reflect the real world. 
There is general agreement in the organizational studies literature that two distinct roles 
(or actions) are performed by boundary spanners: external representation and 
information search/processing (e.g. Aldrich and Herker 1977, Marrone 2010).  The 
former boundary role involves understanding and influencing the complex environment 
in which the organisation operates, representing the organisation and mediating between 
it and other external organisations and maintaining or improving the political legitimacy 
of the organisation. Actions include persuasion and resource-seeking. In relation to the 
latter role, boundary role incumbents act as a filter against environmental information 
overload, acting autonomously on some information and consolidating or transmitting 
other information.  Perrone et al. (2003) note that, while boundary spanners are exposed 
to competing expectations from their own and external organisations, role autonomy 
permits discretionary behaviour and promotes trust externally.  The AC promotes the 
legitimacy of the organisation to investors and regulators.  The crucial importance of the 
personal characteristics of boundary spanners, in addition to institutional and 
organisational characteristics, is emphasised by Williams (2002). 
To our knowledge, only one study has applied the boundary spanner concept to ACs. A 
key external representation role of the AC is to ensure that company management has an 
appropriate relationship with the external auditor.  Seabright et al. (1992) studied 
auditor-client relationships and concluded that attachments between boundary spanners 
play a major role in the maintenance of interorganisational relationships.  While changes 
in clients’ resource needs increase the likelihood of switching auditors, this is reduced 
by individual attachments of CFOs and members of AC.  Attachment is the binding of 
one party to another through experience and as a result of investments in that 
relationship.  Attachments that form between boundary spanners are a mechanism for 
reducing transaction costs but may become overlaid with social content that carries 
strong expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism (Granovetter 1985).  
9Knowledge that there will be continued interactions in the future is likely to reinforce 
development of attachment with more co-operative behavior.  Van de Ven (1976) 
suggests that, over time, individual attachments, which are initially important in a 
relationship, may be replaced by organisational attachment.   
Reflecting on the evolution of ACs in the US, Sabia and Goodfellow (2005) observe that 
the hierarchical, linear, corporate governance model has changed, with all parties now 
interacting with each other in a more dynamic and interdependent way (2005, pp. 6-11).  
In complex organisations, individual boundary spanners may be situated within a team 
within the organization.  In this case, the external environment refers to actors or other 
teams residing outside the team boundaries (in turn these may be embedded within the 
organisational boundary or outside that boundary). Boundary-spanning can, therefore, 
occur at the individual, team and organisational levels (Marrone 2010).  
In the context of the present study, the AC, as a formal sub-committee of the main 
board, can be viewed as a team.  It is a formal element in the corporate governance 
structures, related to the main board by virtue of its sub-committee status.  Under a new 
UK Corporate Governance Code provision, it will report formally to shareholders via a 
separate section of the corporate annual report. It engages in team boundary spanning in 
respect of the CFO and the main board (within the organisational boundary) and in 
respect of the AP and the shareholders (situated outside the organisation). However, the 
ACC is the team member with a key individual boundary spanning role in respect of the 
CFO, main board and AP. The ACC also fulfills a gatekeeping role (i.e. an information 
access boundary role) with respect to both the AC and (indirectly via the AC) the main 
board, deciding when and to what extent they should be involved with an issue (BFH 
2011).3  Thus, boundary spanners act as a ‘bridge’ between inter- and intra-
organisational groups, managing the flow of information and the expectations of actors 
(Williams 2002). By contrast, the gatekeeper metaphor emphasises information access 
and is therefore a more uni-directional concept, one which is subsumed within the 
information role of boundary spanners. The key actors (parties) and linkages, existing 
both within and outside the company, are shown in Figure 1.4
[Figure 1 about here] 
2.4 Audit interaction research and the involvement of the AC post-SOX  
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Archival AC research studies post-SOX relate publicly observable structural AC 
indicators (such as financial experience, independence of directors and frequency of 
meetings) to financial reporting outputs, treating AC processes as a black box. Carcello 
et al. (2011) sum up the findings from over 250 such studies as follows: ‘generally 
speaking, ‘good’ audit committee and board characteristics are associated with measures 
of ‘good’ accounting and auditing and with more effective internal controls’ (p.3).5
A generic behavioural model of the interaction process has been developed and tested 
using both inductive and deductive approaches using a range of experimental, 
questionnaire and interview methods (e.g. Beattie et al. 2001 and 2011, Salterio 2012).  
This behavioural model covers the antecedents and consequences of the interactions as 
well as the stages of the interaction process and the elements of the process. Several 
authors have commented on the paucity of research into AC processes; (e.g. Turley and 
Zaman 2007, p.767, Bédard and Gendron 2010, p.175). It may be noted that behavioural 
theories of corporate governance (of which audit aspects form a part) have recently been 
strongly advocated as a complement to economic agency theories that ignore the socially 
situated nature of the practices of individual actors (e.g. Westphal and Zajac 2013), 
Experimental evidence from the AP and CFO perspective is reviewed in Salterio (2012, 
section 6). In one of the few studies with ACs, DeZoort et al. (2008) find that, in the 
post-SOX US setting, AC member support for auditor-proposed adjustments is 
significantly higher than previously (DeZoort et al. 2003).   
A number of large-scale questionnaire survey studies explore auditor-company 
interactions on financial reporting issues (e.g. Beattie et al., 2000 in the UK; Gibbins et 
al., 2007 in Canada). However these studies focus on the CFO / AP dyad and do not 
consider either ACCs or the AC. Consequently, these studies do not address the 
increasing significance of the AC role in financial reporting following the post-SOX 
changes.  In the only study to date to cover the CFO / AP / AC triad, Beattie et al. 
(2012) survey UK ACCs, APs and CFOs regarding their involvement and that of the AC 
in a range of audit responsibilities (planning, performance and finalisation) set by the 
Combined Code (FRC 2006b).  Thus, the focus is on audit-related issues, rather than 
financial reporting issues. They find evidence of partial AC engagement6, concluding 
that regulators should be cautious about giving ACs additional responsibilities. Finally, 
11
in a wide-ranging survey of 1240 AC members across 34 countries, it is found that only 
54 percent say they ‘drill down’ to a great extent and review key assumptions underlying 
management’s material accounting judgments and estimates (KPMG 2010). The figure 
for the UK is 50%, rising to 75% in the 2013 survey (KPMG 2013).  
In the US, there have been several recent quantitative interview studies regarding the 
actions and behaviour of AC members.  Beasley et al. (2009) find evidence of both 
substantive monitoring (consistent with agency theory) and ceremonial action 
(consistent with institutional theory and the earlier UK findings of Spira (1999)). 
However, considerable variation existed between companies.  Fifty-seven percent of 
interviewees claimed to be involved in discussion of the specific 
judgments/estimates/assumptions concerned with implementing an accounting policy 
and 67% discussed alternative accounting treatments available under GAAP (p. 49).  
Cohen et al. (2010) interview 30 audit managers and partners from three of the Big Four 
audit firms in the US.  Comparisons are made with a similar pre-SOX study (Cohen et 
al., 2002).  It is found that ACs are believed to have become significantly more active 
and diligent, and to possess greater expertise and power, but may play a more passive 
role in resolving financial reporting disputes expecting the auditors and management to 
resolve the issues. They conclude that the AC’s role has changed from being symbolic to 
being an effective monitor of a company’s financial reporting process, thus producing a 
different result from Beasley et al. (2009) by interviewing auditors rather than ACCs. 
Finally, Rupley et al. (2011) report that, post-SOX, US public company audit committee 
members believe that the features of an effective audit committee are present.  
In the UK, Turley and Zaman (2007) examine interactions among key corporate 
governance actors using case study methods, identifying both formal and informal AC 
processes. They conclude that: (i) the most significant effects of the AC on governance 
outcomes occur outside the formal AC structures and processes; (ii) the AC has a 
significant influence on power relations between key organisational participants; and 
(iii) the AC may be used as a threat, ally or arbiter in resolving issues and conflicts.  
Revisiting the approach of Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt (hereafter BFB) (2001) in the 
context of the much changed 2007 / 2008 post-SOX UK regulatory framework, BFH 
(2011) report on nine UK listed company case studies covering entities of different size 
12
and employing different auditors.  The researchers interview CFOs, ACCs and AP, 
exploring the financial reporting and auditing interactions.  They find that the ACC 
(usually the most financially literate member of the AC) is fully engaged in the financial 
reporting process and acts as gatekeeper for the AC by managing the business of the AC 
and deciding which issues go on the agenda. ACCs may personally take on the 
monitoring role that is formally assigned to the AC and wish to be kept informed of 
developments on a ‘no surprises’ principle, leaving the AC to play a more ceremonial 
role at the end of an interaction, ‘reviewing’ or ‘approving’ proposed solutions 
(consistent with Spira (1999) and Beasley et al. (2009)). They also find informal 
processes similar to those identified by Turley and Zaman (2007) (i.e. processes which 
do not involve a formal discussion at the AC meeting or even a referral of the issue to 
the AC). The different behaviour patterns of the individual ACC compared to the full 
AC resonate with the findings of Gendron and Bédard (2006). The CFOs and APs are 
keen to take an agreed position to the ACC or AC.  None of the case interactions 
produced a non-compliant outcome.  
There are indications in the literature that company size and audit firm size are 
associated with AC engagement. The nine cases in BFH (2011) included five FTSE 350 
companies and four outside this group, thus permitting a comparison regarding the 
involvement of ACCs and ACs in the 47 interactions.  In FTSE 350 companies the ACC 
was aware of the issue or had separate discussions outside the AC in 58% of 
interactions, compared with 38% for non-FTSE 350 companies.  This suggests that the 
FTSE 350 ACCs might be more engaged than their counterparts in smaller companies.  
Wider evidence on the quality of corporate governance reporting in annual reports 
(which may be an indicator of the quality of the underlying activity) suggests that ACs 
in larger companies have more successfully adapted to their new responsibilities than 
those in smaller companies (ICAEW / BDO 2011, Deloitte 2011).  
The Audit Inspection Unit’s annual public reports have included comments which 
suggest that ISA (UK&I) 260 has not been applied to a consistently high standard across 
audit firm size categories.  For example, ‘Consistent with prior years, the quality of 
reporting to audit committees by smaller firms was generally of a lower standard than at 
major firms, with the failure to communicate matters in writing a key issue.’ (AIU 2010, 
13
p. 23). The quality of information supplied to an AC will be one of the factors that 
determines how engaged it can be in monitoring the quality of financial reporting.   
In sum, the influence of ACs in the financial reporting process has increased following 
the changes brought about by the passing of SOX in the US. There is also some 
evidence that this influence varies according to company size and audit firm size.  A few 
behavioural, process-focused qualitative studies have been carried out on small numbers 
of companies and many large-scale studies have related AC attributes to financial 
reporting outcomes, adopting an input-output model. There is survey evidence that ACs 
are only partially engaged with audit issues. However, to date, there has been no wide 
ranging survey in any country that explores the relative levels of engagement of the 
ACC, AC, AP and CFO in financial reporting issues. This study contributes to filling the 
gap.  It is recognised that the ‘measurement of AC effectiveness is a complicated matter’ 
(Bédard and Gendron 2010, p.176).  We contend that AC effectiveness is a 
multidimensional construct; one key dimension being AC engagement (i.e. awareness 
and involvement) on financial reporting issues.   
3. DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Given the increased regulatory emphasis placed on the AC in strengthening financial 
reporting quality and the increasing engagement of ACs in financial reporting issues 
(e.g. Beasley et al. 2009), it is to be expected that the ACC respondents should, as a 
minimum position, be aware of discussions concerning financial reporting (both routine 
discussions involving accounting policy and accounting estimates and interactions 
involving an element of conflict resolution).  ‘Awareness’ of an issue following a trigger 
event represents the starting point for the interaction (Salterio 2012). The ACC may 
become aware by being directly involved in the interaction or because other parties 
involved in interactions report it to them.  The first research question is therefore: 
RQ 1: To what extent is the ACC aware of the overall level of discussions taking place 
on issues related to the financial statement compared with CFOs and APs? 
The level of awareness may vary according to the specific nature of the financial 
statement issue which is the subject of the interaction. Interaction may be informal 
(Turley and Zaman 2007) or the AC may operate differently according to the 
characteristics and behaviour of individual members (Gendron and Bédard 2006). Some 
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issues are inherently more complex or serious than others (or may escalate to become 
so) and may prompt broader consultation or formal approval.  The second research 
question is therefore: 
RQ 2: To what extent is the ACC aware of discussions taking place on specific issues 
relating to the financial statements compared with CFOs and APs? 
The responsibilities given to the AC under the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 
2010) and ISA (UK and Ireland) 260 (APB, 2004) are likely to involve either the full 
committee or the ACC in discussions with the CFO and AP.  However there is evidence 
that the AC and ACC are frequently not involved in audit-related discussions (Beattie et 
al. 2012).  Spira (1999) and Beasley et al. (2009) refer to the ceremonial aspect of the 
AC role, while Sabia and Goodfellow (2005) and BFH (2011) refer to ACs not wishing 
to resolve disagreements.  The third research question is therefore: 
RQ 3 (a): To what extent is the full AC routinely involved in discussions on issues 
related to the financial statements; and 
 (b): To what extent is the ACC routinely involved in discussions on issues related 
to the financial statements? 
A range of factors are likely to influence the parties involved in audit interactions (e.g. 
Bédard and Gendron 2010, Lin and Hwang 2010, Carcello et al. 2011).  In particular, 
the nature (e.g. ex ante seriousness) of the financial reporting issue and the company and 
auditor characteristics, which influence the structures and processes surrounding audit 
interactions (Beattie et al. 2012, ICAEW / BDO 2010, AIU 2008).  In particular, scale 
effects have been shown to be pervasive in financial reporting and auditing research, 
captured by company size and audit firm size.  Thus, the fourth research question is: 
RQ 4: To what extent do the following factors have an impact on the parties involved in 
discussions: 
 (a) financial reporting issue; 
 (b) company size; and 
 (c) audit firm size.
4. METHODS 
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The present study utilises experiential questionnaires which ask expert respondents 
about specific events they have encountered (Gibbins and Qu 2005).  Specifically it 
elicits the experiences and views of the three key participant groups in audit interactions: 
CFOs, ACCs and APs. Such direct survey methods provide a real life alternative to other 
research approaches. For example, experimental studies generally take place in an 
artificial simplified setting.  Similarly, archival methods tend to use a proxy measure for 
the underlying variable of interest.  Large-sample questionnaire studies complement in-
depth, small sample interview studies and research advances often display iterations 
between qualitative and quantitative methods, as conceptual models are developed, 
tested, revised and retested.  The purpose of the present paper is to permit generalisation 
in relation to a limited set of interaction characteristics. 
This study focuses on audit interactions related to financial reporting issues. The population 
of interest comprises domestic, UK listed companies, excluding AIM companies and 
investment trusts.  AIM companies were excluded because, at the time of the study they 
were not required to adopt IFRS; investment trusts were excluded because, as they do 
not trade, their accounting, auditing and governance is different. The target sample of 
500 included the top 250 qualifying companies by market capitalisation (as at 5th February 
2007) and a systematic sample (every nth company ranked by market capitalisation) of 250 
from the remaining qualifying companies.  Where the company had delisted, merged or 
demerged, or moved domicile since their last annual report, or reported under US 
GAAP, a replacement was sought from the same industry group and with the closest 
market capitalisation. Key information (name of the CFO and ACC, auditor, date of last 
annual report and the company contact details) was collected from annual reports, websites 
and databases.  The initial company sample resulted in 58 companies (33 involving the top 
250) where the audit committee chair had been selected more than once (in three cases, 
four times).  The 27 cases involving non-top 250 companies were reselected, but this often 
produced new duplications. This reduced the final sample of ACCs to 446.  The co-
operation of large audit firms was enlisted to identify suitable AP respondents (i.e. those 
who were acting as engagement partner for qualifying listed companies) and to facilitate 
the distribution of the questionnaire.  Each of the nine firms involved nominated a contact 
person to assist us.  A maximum of 439 APs were identified as qualifying for inclusion in 
the survey.7  It was not possible to construct a matched sample as the identity of the AP 
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on a particular audit was not a matter of public record in 2007.  Furthermore it would be 
necessary to obtain permission from the client before the AP could be approached. 
The research instrument, contained closed-form questions, organised into six sections. This 
paper reports on the section relating to the discussion and negotiation of financial statement 
issues between the three parties. CFOs and ACCs were asked to respond in respect of their 
own companies, while APs were asked to respond with reference to the largest 
UK/Channel Islands domestic listed client company for whom you act as engagement 
partner (referred to as client X throughout the questionnaire).  
The introduction to the relevant section read as follows: The process which each year 
culminates in the production of company financial statements may involve discussion 
between two or more parties, e.g. the finance director (FD), the auditor, normally the 
audit engagement partner (AP), the AC chair (ACC) and the AC (AC), i.e. the 
participants.  Discussion on various issues, which may arise during any time of the 
financial year, takes place and may lead to negotiation.  Discussion was defined as: 
matters raised by one or more participants and considered in speech or writing. 
A list of 32 financial statement issues was developed from BFB (2000), updated to include 
changes to financial reporting since 1997, in particular the adoption of IFRS.  The issues 
were listed in four categories: consolidation matters (code C); primary statement issues 
(code PS); other accounting issues (code OA); and compliance and other regulatory issues 
(code C&R).8  The general approach was to consider the financial statements and related 
notes line by line, in conjunction with a list of extant IASs/IFRSs, supplementing the 
emergent list of issues with basic issues in company law and listing requirements.  The list 
of issues was revised based on discussion with experienced auditors and CFOs who acted 
as general advisors to the project (see acknowledgements on cover page) and the results of 
pilot testing. Four other (please specify) issues were included (one at the end of each 
grouping).  Table 1 shows the 32 issues in the order that they appeared in the questionnaire. 
[Table 1 about here] 
For each of the 32 financial statement issues that had been the subject of discussion 
and/or negotiation in the most recent financial year for which your financial statements 
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have been finalised but not necessarily published, respondents were asked: Which 
parties were involved in the discussion?, followed by four tick boxes  one each for the 
CFO, AP, ACC and AC. Responses explicitly related to a single year, whereas BFB 
(2000) asked for responses to relate to the latest three years.9
A draft questionnaire was pretested with several CFOs, ACCs and APs involved with listed 
companies and the content, ordering, and terminology was revised accordingly.  
Questionnaires were serially numbered to allow non-respondents to be followed up, and 
were accompanied by an explanatory letter from the researchers which included an 
assurance of confidentiality of responses and a return envelope.  Questionnaires to CFOs 
and ACCs were sent direct by the researchers in June 2007, while those to APs were 
distributed by the audit firms to ensure anonymity of both the APs and their clients.  All AP 
responses were also returned direct to the researchers.  Two reminders were sent to CFOs 
and ACCs  after 10 days and 24 days. The contact in each audit firm was asked to follow 
up in the same way on non-responding APs at similar time intervals.  
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Response rates and tests for bias
From the ACC sample 130 usable responses were received (response rate 29%), the CFO 
sample produced 149 usable responses (30%) and from the AP sample of 439, 219 usable 
responses were received, representing a response rate of 50%. 
To test for response bias, responders and non-responders in the CFO and ACC groups were 
compared on the basis of company size and audit firm size (descriptive statistic are shown 
in Table 2). There is no significant difference in the proportion of non-Big Four affiliated 
respondents (2 = 2.157; p = 0.340.  There are, however, differences in the distribution 
across Stock Exchange groups (2 = 16.823; p = 0.010), with a higher proportion of FTSE 
350 respondents among the ACC sample.  Questionnaire validity can be undermined if 
respondents are not knowledgeable and engaged in the relevant practices at a senior level. 
As there was no evidence that this was the case10, we conclude that the risk of uninformed 
respondent bias in this sample is minimal. 
 [Table 2 about here] 
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5.2 Awareness of discussions on financial statement issues (RQ 1 and RQ 2)
The mean, standard deviation, and median number of issues cited for each respondent type 
is summarised in Table 3.  Discussion may comprise a simple exchange of information, 
such as the provision of advice from the auditor on complex or new technical matters.  It 
may also involve elucidation and confirmation in support of the attest function.  An 
individual might be aware that an interaction took place between two or more other parties 
without being directly involved themselves.  Table 3 indicates that, as a group, ACCs cited 
a slightly higher mean number of issues discussed then the other two respondent groups, 
although their median was the lowest indicating a skewed distribution with possible outliers 
at the top end.  However both measures of central tendency for ACCs are broadly in line 
with those for the other respondent groups, although the standard deviation indicates a 
larger variation in responses than for CFOs and APs.  In response to RQ 1, ACCs overall 
level of awareness of financial reporting interactions is comparable to that of CFOs and 
APs.  Since a lack of awareness of issues would indicate incomplete information search 
activities by the ACC, it may be inferred from this that the ACC is fulfilling their individual 
boundary-spanning role in relation to information search on behalf of the full AC.  
 [Table 3 about here] 
For each respondent group, the infrequency with which each of the 32 issues relating to the 
production of annual financial statements is reported by each group as being discussed is 
shown in Table 4.  To focus on those issues not discussed, issues are shown in increasing
frequency.  The ordering is based on the ACC group, with frequency ranks shown for each 
group.   
 [Table 4 about here] 
The least frequently cited issues for discussion show little variation between the three 
respondent groups and it is noticeable that the ACCs tended to report discussion of these 
items at least as frequently as the other respondent groups.  Only three of the ten issues 
least frequently cited by ACCs were cited by a higher percentage of APs or CFOs.  It is 
of note that several of the least discussed issues would be considered fundamental to the 
quality of financial reporting (e.g. substance over form/ true and fair view issues, 
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maintenance of proper accounting transactions, going concern) but would not be 
expected to be an explicit feature of every audit.  It would be expected that ACCs would 
be aware of these issues in fulfillment of their information search boundary-spanning 
role and this does appear to be the case. Other issues in this category might be viewed as 
covered by relatively straightforward accounting standards which have changed little in 
the recent past (e.g. plant, property and equipment).  The most surprising infrequently 
discussed issue is fraud and illegal acts, given that Provision C.3.2 of the Combined 
Code (FRC 2008) states that one of the responsibilities of the AC is to review the 
companys internal financial controls, and unless expressly addressed by a separate 
board risk committee, or by the board itself, to review the companys internal financial 
control and risk management systems. A similar provision is included in the proposed 
EU regulation (EC 2011).  
At the other end of the Table 4, the most frequent issues for discussion also vary little 
between the three respondent groups.  Three issues relating to business combinations 
(intangible assets / goodwill, fair value on acquisition and issues in subsidiary 
undertakings) feature for all groups and may have been used interchangeably by 
respondents.  This high ranking may be attributed to the requirement in IFRS 3 that 
identifiable intangible assets must be recognised on acquisition.  This requirement was 
new at the time and controversial (BFH 2011).  Presentation of primary statements was 
ranked joint second by ACCs (in common with APs) along with exceptional items (also 
ranked within the top ten by the other two groups).  This is an area where IFRS is less 
restrictive than UK GAAP, as IAS 1 permits flexibility in the presentation of the income 
statement; this major change is likely to have provoked discussion on, for example, the 
presentation of reorganisation costs (BFH 2011).   
There is broad agreement between the three groups on the frequency of issues discussed.  
Out of a possible 32 issues, only eight are significantly different (at the 5% level) between 
groups, but all of them involve ACCs and at least one other group.  In particular, ACCs are 
significantly less likely than APs to cite share based payments, issues in subsidiary 
undertakings and fraud and illegal acts as a discussion issue.  In relation to these three 
issues, ACCs show a similar level of awareness of such issues as CFOs (though not 
APs), suggesting that they are only in part fulfilling the information search role in 
relation to these important issues. 
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There are five issues significantly more likely to be cited by the ACCs than at least one 
other group.  These are: issues in associates and joint ventures, maintenance of proper 
accounting records (cited by APs), identification of pre / post acquisition expenses, 
related party transactions (cited by CFOs) and prior year adjustments (both groups).  In 
BFB (2000) it was apparent that APs tended to emphasise narrower compliance issues 
rather than those involving commercial judgement. Such a trend is not apparent in this 
study. It is interesting that APs are less concerned about proper accounting records.  
In response to RQ 2 for many specific issues the ACCs level of awareness is similar to 
the other respondent groups.  It can be concluded that the ACC is, in general, 
satisfactorily performing their information search boundary role. However, there are 
several significant differences which do not have an obvious explanation. These may, at 
least in part, be attributable to the noise introduced by unmatched samples. 
5.3 Parties involved in interactions (RQ 3 and RQ 4(a))
The questionnaire asked respondents to indicate, by means of four tick boxes, whether 
or not each of the following four key individuals/groups were involved in discussions: 
CFO, AP, ACC and AC.  It is not only the presence/absence of each key party that is of 
interest, it is also the particular configuration of parties. Given this format, there are 16 
possible combinations of responses for each financial reporting issue listed.  If none of 
the four parties was involved, this means that there was no discussion in relation to that 
issue, leaving 15 combinations that indicate discussion occurred.  If only one of the four 
parties was involved, this can be interpreted as meaning that discussions were held with 
parties outside the four listed (e.g. company management or directors other than the 
CFO and AC members, members of the audit team or audit firm other than the AP, other 
outside parties, such as legal advisors, partner from another audit firm, etc.).   
Across all potential discussion issues, the combined sample reported 5,445 discussions.  
The parties involved in these discussions are shown in Table 5, which reports 
frequencies for the 15 combinations.  The most common set of parties involved in 
discussions was all four (37%), followed by the CFO / AP dyad (28%).  Detailed results 
by company size and audit firm tier are shown in the Appendix.  
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 [Table 5 about here] 
To facilitate further analysis of this data (Tables 6), we focussed on the two groupings of 
the reported combinations considered to be of the greatest interest. The groupings are as 
follows: 
 No AC or ACC (both the full AC and the ACC left out, i.e. combinations 1, 2 
and 5 shown in Table 5); 
 Presence of ACC but absence of full AC in discussion (i.e. combinations 3, 6, 8 
and 11) 
[Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 shows, for each financial reporting issue included on the questionnaire, the 
percentage of discussions occurring for both key groupings for the combined sample.  
The 32 issues are organised into the four issue categories identified in section 4.  To 
provide context, the final column shows the incidence of discussions. Thus, for the first 
issue, 63.3% of respondents reported awareness of a discussion; of these discussions, 
39.7% did not involve either the AC or ACC and 7.0% involved the ACC but not the 
full AC.  The final two rows of Table 6 show the number and percentage aggregated 
across all issues. 
It can be seen that 35.3% of discussions do not involve either the AC or the ACC, 
indicating a lack of any active AC engagement in over one-third of interactions.  Thus, 
boundary-spanning involvement in either or both of the roles of external representation 
and information search and processing is absent at both the individual and team levels.  
We suggest that ACCs may perform an information processing role in relation to 
themselves, by filtering out issues where they elect not to become involved.  This may 
be because they recognise that their time available for AC activities is limited and 
therefore must be rationed.  Rationing will most affect issues where the ACC believes 
that they do not have superior technical or business knowledge to the CFO / AP dyad 
and which are successfully resolved by this dyad.  Such issues are unlikely to result in 
AC engagement due to the gatekeeping role of the ACC. 
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This 35.3% level of AC/ACC non-engagement is significantly higher than for audit-
related issues (Beattie et al. 2012). This may be because the various audit-related roles 
and responsibilities of the AC are detailed explicitly, whereas the responsibilities in 
relation to financial reporting issues are mentioned more generically.  Moving on to 
distinguish the individual ACC from the full ACC, 6.0% of interactions involve the 
ACC but not the AC.  This is consistent with the view that ACCs perform, in a 
significant minority of interactions, an individual information processing (gatekeeping) 
boundary role (Marrone 2010) with respect to the AC, blocking, filtering, transmitting or 
summarising information as they see fit.  This is a lower level than found by Beattie et 
al. (2012) for audit-related issues (6% c.f. 11%).  In response to RQ 3 (a) and (b) the 
evidence suggests that the AC and ACC are not fully engaged in discussions on all 
aspects of financial reporting decision-making.  However, given that the ACCs level of 
awareness of interactions is broadly the same as that of the other groups, it may be 
inferred that, while ACCs want to be kept informed, they do not expect to be routinely 
involved in decision making. This is consistent with the findings from the case studies 
within BFH (2011). The lack of ACC and AC involvement also suggests that an AC or 
an ACC may, rather than engaging in active decision-making, fulfil a passive ceremonial 
type role (Turley and Zaman 2007) and review and approve an issue without any 
discussion or questioning.   
Turning to the detail in Table 6, a number of observations can be made from inspection 
of this table.  The issues which are most likely to involve the ACC but not the AC are 
requirements of listing rules prescribed by the FSA, matters arising from compliance 
with the Companies Act and other accounting standards, statements in the annual 
report concerning compliance with the Combined Code, exceptional items and fair 
value on acquisition (each with a percentage between 9.0% and 9.6%).  The ACC is 
often the member of the AC with recent and relevant financial experience and might be 
expected to deal with narrow issues of compliance where other members of the AC with 
broader business knowledge might have less to contribute.  The first three of these issues 
are from the compliance and regulatory issues section of the questionnaire and would 
appear to fit this description, although it might be expected that the full AC should be 
concerned with how corporate governance activities are reported.  
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The two issues for which discussions are most likely to exclude both the ACC and AC 
are consolidation matters.  However the matters concerned (dividends from 
subsidiaries and identification of pre/post acquisition expenses) are relatively 
uncontroversial.  There is no obvious pattern for the other issues where AC / ACC are 
involved less frequently.  At the other end of the scale it is not surprising that they are 
least likely to excluded from discussions about fraud and illegal acts, going concern 
and statements in the annual report concerning compliance with the Combined Code as 
these cover fundamental AC responsibilities.  In response to RQ 4(a), it would appear that 
the nature of the financial reporting issue does have an impact on the parties involved in 
interactions. The absence of any full AC or ACC involvement ranges from 62% (dividends 
from subsidiaries) down to 17% (fraud and illegal acts).   
Further analysis revealed that the parties involved reported, as reported by ACC 
respondents, are significantly different from those reported by the other two respondent 
groups.  The ACCs report significantly fewer discussions than the CFOs or APs where 
neither they nor the full AC is involved (21%, 45% and 38%, respectively; 2 =209.5, sig 
< 0.01).  They also report more interactions where the ACC but not the full AC is 
involved (9%, 5% and 5%, respectively; 2 =26.4, sig < 0.01). Given that the ACCs 
reported substantially the same number of discussions as the other two groups (see Table 
3, row 1), this does seem to suggest that the perceptions/recollections of parties involved 
varies across the respondent groups rather than there being discussions of which the 
ACC is simply unaware.  Previous research into the reported level of issue negotiation 
by APs and CFOs has found that APs report a higher level, attributing this to the 
relatively higher incentives of APs to recall and declare such interactions (Beattie et al. 
2000, p.199). Similarly, ACCs are likely to be more sensitive than either APs or CFOs 
to their explicit responsibility in relation to significant accounting issues, causing them 
to report higher levels of engagement.  Another (not mutually exclusive) explanation is 
that, despite the large sample sizes, the findings reflect random noise rather than a 
systematic effect. The unmatched nature of the samples exacerbates the noise in the data. 
5.4 Influences on parties involved (RQ 4(b) and (c)) 
The relationship between the incidence of particular groupings and the background 
characteristics of company size and audit firm size is examined in Table 7, panels (a) 
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and (b), respectively.  While it is well-established that there is a strong positive 
correlation between company size and audit firm size (Moizer and Turley 1987, p.120), 
both variables are examined since distinct organisational practices (company-side or 
audit firm-side) can influence the parties involved in discussions. 
In addition to the two groupings shown in Table 6, five other groupings are presented as 
follows: 
 No AC or ACC (both the full AC and the ACC left out, i.e. combinations 1, 2 
and 5 shown in Table 5); 
 ACC but no AC (combinations 3, 6, 8 and 11); 
 No AP or AC (both the AP and the full AC left out, i.e. combinations 1, 3 and 6); 
 No CFO (the CFO is left out, i.e. combinations 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10 and 14); 
 All in (none of the four key parties is left out, with ACC acting either as part of 
the full AC or separately from it as an individual, i.e. combinations 12 and 15); 
 No AC (the full AC is left out, i.e. combinations 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 11); and 
 No AP (the AP left out, i.e. combinations 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10 and 13). 
[Table 7 about here] 
Panel (a), concerned with company size (proxied by the dichotomous variable FTSE 350 
member), shows significant results across all seven groupings.  FTSE 350 affiliated 
respondents were more likely to report All in and (curiously) No CFO and less likely 
to report instances of the other five groupings.  Conversely non-FTSE 350 companies 
were significantly more likely to report that the AC or both the ACC and AC were not 
involved in an interaction.  The incidence of ACC but no AC is 4.7% in FTSE 350 
companies compared with 8.5% in non-FTSE 350 companies.  This would appear to 
indicate that ACCs in smaller companies interpret their boundary filtering role with 
respect to the AC differently.  They may be more sceptical about the extent to which the 
rest of the AC can contribute effectively to a discussion of financial reporting issues or it 
may mean that processes are more informal and that more matters are settled outside of 
committee meetings (Turley and Zaman 2007).  A further interpretation might be that in 
smaller companies, the ACC may become involved in discussions as an additional 
source of financial reporting expertise.  In response to RQ 4(b), it would appear that 
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company size influences the nature of the boundary filtering role and, consequently, has 
an effect on the parties involved in an interaction.   
Finally, panel (b), concerned with audit firm size, does not reveal many significant 
differences.  Big Four affiliated respondents (i.e. Big Four APs or the CFOs or ACCs of 
companies with a Big Four auditor) were significantly more likely to report All in and 
less likely to report ACC but no AC or No AC.  Of course, the auditor tier and 
company size measures are likely to be highly correlated, as large companies tend to 
select large audit firms (Moizer and Turley 1987).  Regarding RQ 4 (c) it would appear 
that audit firm size will have, at most, a marginal impact on who is involved in an 
interaction. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Post-financial crisis, and building on the provisions of SOX, actual and proposed 
regulatory reforms focus on extending AC engagement as a means to improve the 
quality of financial reporting (EC 2011, §23, Competition Commission 2013, FRC 
2012). Although ACs are widely acknowledged as a key corporate governance 
mechanism, very little is known about their engagement in the process by which the 
financial statements are co-constituted by the actors affiliated to the auditee company 
and the audit firm.  Previous questionnaire studies have focussed only on the CFO / AP 
dyad (Beattie et al. 2000, Gibbins et al. 2007). The present study complements the 
limited extant case study research on the CFO / AP / AC triad (Beattie et al. 2011, 
Salleh and Stewart 2012) by providing large sample evidence that can be generalised to 
the population of interest.  This population comprises listed companies operating in 
post-IFRS adoption, post-SOX, Anglo-Saxon corporate governance environments.  This 
evidence reveals how crucial existing AC responsibilities are being discharged, offering 
a valuable baseline for future academic research and policy-making. 
By means of an experiential questionnaire survey of the three principal parties in the 
financial reporting interaction process (CFOs, APs and ACCs), the nature and extent of 
engagement of AC in financial reporting issues is investigated.  AC engagement in these 
interactions is conceived as a two-stage process comprising awareness and involvement.  
The ACC (and the AC) are viewed as fulfilling the role of boundary spanners, a 
theoretical construct drawn from the organisational studies literature. Moreover, the 
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ACC fulfils an additional gatekeeping role with respect to the AC and the main board. 
AC effectiveness is a multidimensional construct and its evaluation is acknowledged to 
be difficult (Bédard and Gendron 2010).  We contend that, in additional to investigating 
publicly observable AC dimensions such as meeting frequency, a dimension of central 
importance is AC engagement (i.e. awareness and involvement) on financial reporting 
issues. Following Beattie et al. (2012), the involvement of the ACC is considered 
separately from the full AC. 
It is found that ACCs overall level of awareness of financial reporting interactions was 
comparable to that of CFOs and APs (the median number of issues is 10, 10 and 11, 
respectively). Their level of awareness of specific issues was also broadly in line with 
CFOs and APs (there was no significant difference for 75% of the issues).  For those eight 
issues where a significant difference did exist, no systematic explanation was apparent. 
One surprise was that ACCs were significantly less likely than APs to be aware of 
discussions on fraud and illegal acts, given that they are charged with specific 
responsibilities in this area under the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2006b).  
This is of particular interest as it is also an internal control and risk-related matter of 
concern to the EC (2011).  
Across 5,445 reported discussions, 35.3% did not involve either the AC or the ACC, 
Thus, in over one-third of interactions, the AC fulfilled no boundary spanning role (in 
most of these cases, the interaction involved the traditional CFO / AP dyad.  These 
findings indicate that neither the AC nor the ACC were fully engaged in all aspects of 
financial reporting decision-making.  However it is clear from qualitative, case study 
evidence (BFH 2011) that ACCs do not expect to be involved in routine decision 
making. Fundamental financial reporting issues such as fraud and going concern were 
most likely to involve ACs and ACCs.  The present study finds a significantly lower 
overall level of involvement of the AC in financial reporting interactions, compared to 
audit-related tasks and responsibilities (Beattie et al. 2012)  35% involve neither the 
ACC nor AC compared to 25%.  This provides further evidence of partial engagement, 
supporting the conclusion of Beattie et al. (2012) regulators should be cautious about 
giving ACs additional responsibilities. 
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The significant minority of cases (6.0%) where the ACC but not the AC was involved 
reveal situations where the ACC acts as a boundary spanning gatekeeper to the full AC 
(Coffee 2006).  These cases are indicative of informal AC processes, such as found in 
prior research (Gendron and Bédard 2006, Turley and Zaman 2007, BFH 2012). There 
was some evidence that ACCs were more likely to be involved without other members 
of the AC on compliance and regulatory issues. The significant lack of engagement by 
the AC is consistent with the findings of KPMG in relation to AC involvement in 
judgments and estimates (2010; 2013). ACC respondents reported significantly fewer 
discussions than the other two respondent groups where neither they nor the full AC was 
involved, suggesting that the perceptions/recollections of parties involved varied across 
the respondent groups (although the number of recalled discussions did not).   
The relationship between the incidence of particular parties involved and background 
characteristics revealed several significant associations.  Respondents affiliated with 
large listed companies were more likely to report All in and, interestingly, No CFO. 
The latter finding is, however, based on a very small number of instances.  It is hard to 
believe that the CFO is not involved in all financial reporting issues.  Non-FTSE 350 
companies were more likely to report that ACCs acted without the rest of the AC.  Big 
Four affiliated respondents were significantly more likely to report All in and less 
likely to report either ACC but no AC or No AC, but there were relatively few 
significant differences suggesting only a marginal impact.   
The results indicate that not all financial reporting issues are dealt with in the same way and 
that interactions may involve different parties depending on the nature of the issue, the size 
of the company and to a lesser extent, the size of the audit firm.  A substantial proportion of 
discussions of financial reporting interactions do not involve the ACC as an individual 
separate from the AC and many do not involve the full AC.  Given that the AC can be 
viewed as a boundary spanning group with a key role interceding between management 
and the AP, their absence from many interactions must be a potential cause for concern.  
BFH (2011) found a marked improvement in the quality of interaction outcomes compared 
with the earlier BFB (2001) case studies, conducted before ACs were given an enhanced 
role within the regulatory framework.  The nature of this survey study does not permit 
investigation into the significance to the financial statements of the issues of which the 
various parties were aware, but did not discuss. It is possible that issues may be 
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approved or agreed by the ACC or the AC without discussion. Another interpretation is 
that the AC exerted a passive role in encouraging APs and CFOs to resolve disputes 
between themselves (Cohen et al. 2010).  Attachments that have formed between boundary 
spanners may have produced expectations of trust so that ACCs and ACs believe that 
CFOs and APs will generally act constructively rather than opportunistically (Seabright et 
al., 1992; Granovetter, 1985).  If the attachment is at the organisational level, then the 
rotation of APs or the departure of other boundary spanners may not be significant (van de 
Ven, 1976).  BFH (2011) found that, while ACCs were keen to be updated on problem 
areas to avoid surprises, they expected CFOs (with superior business knowledge) and APs 
(with superior technical accounting knowledge) to be able to resolve most issues between 
themselves. It is also possible that some financial reporting issues are very complex for an 
AC with possibly only one member with recent and relevant financial experience, although 
discussions on other issues might benefit from contributions from members with broader 
business experience (Cohen et al. 2008). 
The less than full engagement by ACs and ACCs in financial reporting interactions 
revealed by this research will be of interest to regulators as they consider further 
developments to the role of ACs and ACCs following the financial crisis. The evidence 
of the ACC performing a gatekeeper role in relation to the full AC, particularly in 
smaller companies is a matter of concern if the distinction between management and 
monitoring becomes blurred and the independence of NEDs and the level of trust 
associated with them (Perrone et al. 2003) is brought into question.  The absence of 
engagement by either the ACC or the AC in slightly over one third of financial reporting 
discussion interactions suggests that caution should be exercised by regulators in 
expecting too much of an ACC and AC in financial reporting matters. While passive 
awareness may be adequate in relation to some issues, the finding that in 17.2% of 
discussions about fraud and illegal acts neither the ACC nor the AC is involved does 
give cause for concern. This issue is a named responsibility of the AC in the Combined 
Code where active involvement would be expected. The findings also raise the question 
of whether one set of regulations is appropriate and practical for companies of all sizes, 
or whether FTSE 350 companies should be considered separately.  
There are other potential dangers in extending the responsibilities of ACs and ACCs.  
Perrone et al. (2003) argue that formal role definitions are not good predictors of trust and 
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that only when boundary spanners exercise discretion does this provide information about 
their trustworthiness.  If the opportunities to exercise discretion are curtailed by extending 
the scope of codes that formally define their roles, it becomes more difficult for external 
parties to ascertain the motivations and trustworthiness of individuals.  This becomes 
pertinent when they need to deal with unplanned contingencies and move outside of the 
strict specifications of the role and may potentially impact on external legitimacy.   This 
resonates with BFH (2011) who found that in a strong compliance culture the highest 
quality financial reporting outcomes were no longer achievable. 
Bezemer et al. (2007) argue that corporate governance codes have tended to increase the 
control and internal service tasks (i.e. acting as advisers and counsellors to executive 
directors) of non-executive directors, leaving them less time for their external 
representation boundary spanning role which focuses on value created through 
relationships and acquiring access to resources.   They suggest that any further shift in this 
direction may change the selection criteria for NEDS, so that individuals with networking 
skills, able to add value and external legitimacy are overlooked in favour of those able to 
demonstrate a cognitive fit with existing board members. The increasing demands made on 
the time of NEDs are likely to impact adversely on their recruitment. FTSE 350 
companies are likely to find it easier than smaller companies to appoint ACs composed 
of individuals with appropriate expertise and qualities to undertake the increasingly 
onerous responsibilities. Interestingly, the EC (2011) is proposing that one member of 
the AC should have auditing experience and another should have either auditing or 
financial reporting experience, thus increasing the requirement for relevant expertise 
compared with the current UK regime.  
As with all research the present study has inevitable limitations.  In particular, the 
questionnaire approach brings response noise and potential response biases.  However, 
these risks are mitigated by the seniority of the respondents (minimal risk of uninformed 
respondent bias) and the relatively high response rate obtained.  In terms of further 
research, the growing focus on the contribution of ACs and ACCs to the integrity of 
financial reporting is a key area of research. Future studies of the antecedents and 
consequences of different configurations of the parties involved (i.e. different 
engagement patterns), would contribute greatly to knowledge. Possible antecedents exist 
at the level of the individual, group (AC team) and organisation and may be contingent 
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upon the nature of the financial statement issue. A particularly interesting issue is 
whether the level of engagement of an AC or ACC on financial reporting issues can be 
related to earnings management or other observable proxies for poor quality accounting 
outcomes. It would be of interest to explore the role of other individuals and groups 
beyond the CFO / AP / AC triad (such as the CEO, main board, audit review partner, 
technical departments). However it should be noted that, while executive directors may 
attend AC meetings, the revised grounded theory model of audit interactions developed 
by BFH (2011) finds that the influence of company context (including main board 
influence) is fairly marginal in the changed regulatory context.  There is also a need for 
rich, qualitative case studies, building on BFH (2011), which elicit more information 
about how ACs and ACCs engage with financial reporting and perform their individual 
and team boundary spanning roles.  Potentially relevant individual processes which may 
be explored include social influence, norms of reciprocity, and social identity (Westphal 
and Zajac 2013), and potentially relevant group processes include leadership, norms, 
trust, group cohesion, group potency and group identity (Brown 2000). 
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NOTES
1 Neither the 2008 nor the 2010 revisions to the Corporate Governance Code (FRC 2008, 2010) materially 
changed the requirements for audit committees in relation to financial reporting in comparison with 2007. 
Changes introduced in the aftermath of the financial crisis into the 2012 revision require companies (for 
accounting periods beginning on or after 1 October 2012) to include in a separate section of the annual 
report a description of ‘the significant issues that [the audit committee] considered in relation to the 
financial statements, and how these issues were addressed (FRC 2012, para. C.3.8).  
2 In 2005 the UK adopted International Auditing Standards with some adjustments to ensure compliance 
with UK company law.  
3 Furthermore, the usual code requirement that the AC should include at least one person with recent and 
relevant financial experience could be viewed as a resource for smaller companies with smaller finance 
functions. 
4 It is noted that other actors also fulfil boundary spanning roles, however the focus of the present study is 
the AC. 
5 Representative UK studies include Song and Windram (2004) and Al Najjar (2011); Piot and Janin 
(2007) consider France; Pucheta-Martínez and de Fuentes (2007) consider Spain.
6 While the mean reported incidence of discussions was found to be broadly similar across the three 
respondent groups, 11% of discussions involve the ACC only, rather than the full AC, and a further 25% 
do not involve any member of the AC.   
7 Four weeks prior to mailing the questionnaire, the names and addresses of companies, CFOs and ACCs were 
checked and where necessary corrected using Regulatory News Service data (which requires prompt 
announcement of changes in board and directorate membership).
8. A fifth group of 2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act issues and one item relating to regulated industries are excluded 
from the present paper as they do not apply to all companies. 
9. BFB (2000) used a longer three year period to ensure that some negotiation activity was picked up by 
the questionnaire.  In the present study, a single year was used as, based on the evidence in BFB, this 
would generate sufficient levels of negotiation to be informative and to avoid straddling pre- and post 
IFRS implementation. 
10. ACC respondents were all audit committee chairs, with the exception of two who were Deputy Chairs; 
AP respondents were all listed company audit engagement partners (4 responses were eliminated as they 
did not fall within the criteria set for the following reasons: client reported under US GAAP only, client 
not yet on IFRS (AIM company), AP audited investment trusts only; and client was a public sector 
organisation); CFO respondents, based on job title, were FD/Group FD/CFO (74%), financial controller (9%), 
(group) chief accountant (3%), deputy FD (1%) and other/non stated (13%). 
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Figure 1: The Boundary Spanning and Gatekeeping Roles of the ACC and AC 
Notes to figure:  
1. AC = audit committee; ACC = audit committee chair; CFO = finance director; AP = audit partner. 
2. Very thick solid black lines denote individual-level boundary spanning by the ACC. 
3. Thick solid black lines denote team boundary spanning by the AC and may include formal 
corporate governance reporting responsibilities (reporting as a sub-committee to the main board 
and, from 2013, to the shareholders via a separate section of the corporate annual report).  
4. Thick solid grey lines denote formal corporate governance responsibilities. 
5. Thin dashed lines represent other relationships. 
6.   denotes gatekeeping role. 
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Table 1:  Listing of Issues in the Questionnaire Instrument
No. Consolidation matters (C) No. Compliance and other regulatory issues 
(C&R)
1 Issues in subsidiary undertakings1 28 Maintenance of proper accounting records1
2 Issues in associates or joint ventures1 29 Directors’ remuneration report2
3 Fair value on acquisition1 30 Statements in the annual report concerning 
compliance with the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance2 (please specify)
4 Identification of pre/post acquisition 
expenses1 
31 Matters arising from compliance  with the 
Companies Acts and  accounting standards not 
covered above1 (please specify)
5 Dividends from subsidiaries3 32 Requirements of listing rules prescribed by the 
Financial Services Authority2 
6 Segmental reporting3
 Other   (please specify)
 Primary statement issues (PS)
7 Revenue recognition1
8 Exceptional items2
9 Share based payments3
10 Retirement or other employee benefits 
(e.g. pension schemes)2 
11 Property, plant and equipment2
12 Leases1
13 Intangible assets / goodwill2
14 Financial instruments3
15 Inventories2
16 Liabilities/provisions1
17 Contingent assets and liabilities2
18 Deferred tax assets / liabilities1
19 Equity / debt classification3
 Other   (please specify)
 Other accounting issues (OA)
20 Presentation of  the primary financial 
statements3 
21 Post balance sheet events1
22 Prior year adjustments1
23 Related party transactions1
24 Going concern1
25 Fraud and illegal acts1
26 Business Review3
27 Substance over form / true and fair view 
issues2 (please specify)
 Other   (please specify)
Notes: 
1. Issue included in Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt (2000) (BFB) study. 
2. Issue adapted from BFB study (e.g. broadened, issues combined or terminology updated to IFRS). 
3. New issue; not included in BFB study. 
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Table 2:  Analysis of Respondent Groups by Company Size and Audit Firm Size 
Panel (a): Company Size (Stock Exchange Group)  
Stock Exchange 
Group 
Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) sample 
Audit Committee 
Chair (ACC) sample 
Audit Partner 
(AP) sample 
No. % No. % No. % 
FTSE 350 92 62.1 88 68.7 137 63.4
Non-FTSE 355 56 37.9 40 31.2 79 36.6
Missing 1 - 2 - 3 -
Total 149 100.0 130 100.0 219 100.0
Panel (b): Audit Firm Size 
Audit firm type 
Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) sample 
Audit Committee 
Chair (ACC) sample 
Audit Partner 
(AP) sample 
No. % No. % No. % 
Big four 131 88.5 118 91.5 188 86.2
Non-big four 17 11.5 11 8.5 30 13.8
Missing 1 - 1 - 1 -
Total 149 100.0 130 100.0 219 100.0
Note to table: 
Percentages are based on non-missing values. 
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Table 3:  Summary Statistics of Awareness of Issues by Group
 Number of issues cited:1
Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 
CFO ACC AP CFO ACC AP CFO ACC AP 
Discussion interaction 10.40 11.61 10.89 6.80 8.12 6.06 10 9.5 11 
    Notes to table: 
1. The maximum number of issues is 32.  
2. ACC = audit committee chair; CFO = finance director; AP = audit partner. 
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Table 4:  Infrequency of Awareness of Discussion of Issues 
% indicating discussion 
took place3 (n=) Rank 
ANOVA 
test of 
difference 
between 
groups 
(prob.,5
Issue1 
Issue 
category2 
ACC 
(130) 
CFO 
(149) 
AP 
(219) CFO ACC AP  
Substance over form / true and fair view 
issues 
OA 4.6 4.7 1.8 32 32 32 NS 
Matters arising from compliance  with the 
Companies Acts and  accounting 
standards not covered 
C 
11.5 8.7 11.0 30= 31 31 NS 
Equity / debt classification PS 17.7 8.7 11.4 30= 30 30 NS 
Fraud and illegal acts OA 20.0 14.8 31.1 27 28= 16 0.001
3e,f 
Requirements of listing rules prescribed 
by the Financial Services Authority
C&R 20.0 17.4 14.2 25= 28= 27 NS 
Related party transactions OA 20.8 10.1 18.7 29 27 23= 0.032
3d,e 
Dividends from subsidiaries C 22.3 17.4 14.6 23 26 26 NS 
Maintenance of proper accounting records C&R 23.1 17.4 12.8 25= 25 28= 0.045
3c 
Leases PS 24.6 18.1 16.9 24 24 25 NS 
Property, plant and equipment PS 25.4 19.5 26.5 20 23 17= NS 
Going concern OA 26.9 18.8 26.5 21= 22 17= NS 
Identification of pre/post acquisition 
expenses
C 27.7 14.1 18.7 28 20= 23= 0.015
3d 
Inventories PS 27.7 21.5 21.9 19 20= 22 NS 
Post balance sheet events OA 30.0 25.5 22.8 17 19 20= NS 
Contingent assets and liabilities PS 32.3 24.8 26.5 18 18 17= NS 
Prior year adjustments OA 33.1 18.8 12.8 21= 17 28= 0.000
3c,d 
Issues in associates or joint ventures C 35.4 30.2 22.8 15 16 20= 0.0353c 
Statements in the annual report 
concerning compliance with the 
Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance 
C&R 
42.3 29.5 35.6 16 13= 15 NS 
Share based payments PS 42.3 44.3 54.8 12 13= 5= 0.0383f 
Retirement or other employee benefits 
(e.g. pension schemes)
PS 42.3 46.3 42.9 11 13= 13 NS 
Deferred tax assets / liabilities PS 43.8 56.4 51.1 4 12 9 NS 
Directors’ remuneration report C&R 45.4 37.6 40.6 14 10= 14 NS 
Financial instruments PS 45.4 38.9 43.4 13 10= 12 NS 
Segmental reporting C 49.2 57.7 54.8 3 9 5= NS 
Issues in subsidiary undertakings C 53.1 61.1 71.2 2 8 1 0.0023f 
Revenue recognition PS 53.8 53.0 54.3 7= 6= 7 NS 
Business Review OA 53.8 55.7 55.3 5= 6= 4 NS 
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% indicating discussion 
took place3 (n=) Rank 
ANOVA 
test of 
difference 
between 
groups 
(prob.,5
Issue1 
Issue 
category2 
ACC 
(130) 
CFO 
(149) 
AP 
(219) CFO ACC AP  
Liabilities/provisions PS 55.4 49.0 53.0 9= 5 8 NS 
Fair value on acquisition C 57.7 49.0 49.3 9= 2= 10= NS 
Exceptional items PS 57.7 53.0 49.3 7= 2= 10= NS 
Presentation of  the primary financial 
statements
OA 57.7 55.7 63.9 5= 2= 2 NS 
Intangible assets / goodwill2 PS 58.5 62.4 59.4 1 1 3 NS 
    Notes to table: 
  1. Issues are shown in increasing frequency for the ACC sample. 
  2. Consolidation matters (code C); primary statement issues (code PS); other accounting 
issues (code OA); and compliance and other regulatory issues (code C&R). 
  3. ACC = audit committee chair; CFO = finance director; AP = audit partner. 
  4. Issue which, based on ANOVA multiple comparison procedures (Tukey’s HSD), is 
significantly (10% level) more frequently cited: 
a) by CFOs than ACCs; 
b) by CFOs than APs; 
c) by ACCs than APs 
d) by ACCs than CFOs 
e) by APs than CFOs 
f) by APs than ACCs 
  5. NS = not significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 5:  Parties Involved in Discussions 
Parties involved1 
Combined 
 No. % Rank 
1. CFO only 355 6.5 4
2. AP only 32 0.6 
3. ACC only 5 0.1 
4. AC only 34 0.6 
5. CFO + AP 1536 28.2 2
6. CFO + ACC 52 1.0 
7. CFO + AC 155 2.9 6
8. AP + ACC 4 0.1 
9. AP + AC 35 0.6 
10. ACC + AC 4 0.1 
11. CFO+AP+ACC 266 4.9 5
12. CFO+AP + AC2 836 15.4 3
13. CFO+ACC+AC 115 2.1 7
14. AP + ACC +AC 8 0.1 
15. CFO+AP+ACC + AC 2008 36.8 1
Total 5445 100.0 
Notes to table: 
1. ACC = audit committee chair; CFO = finance director; AP = audit partner.
2. This combination includes the ACC acting as part of the full AC but not separately in an 
individual capacity
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Table 6: Incidence of Lack of AC Involvement in Discussions of Specific Issues – 
Combined Sample (n=498) 
Issue 
Absence of any AC or 
ACC involvement in 
discussion 
% 
Presence of ACC but 
Absence of full AC in 
discussion 
Incidence of 
discussion – combined 
group 
% 
Consolidation matters 
Issues in subsidiary undertakings 39.7 7.0 63.3 
Issues in associates or joint ventures 41.8 4.3 28.3 
Fair value on acquisition 31.6 9.0 51.4 
Identification of pre/post acq’n 
expenses 
56.1 3.1 19.7 
Dividends from subsidiaries 62.1 3.4 17.5 
Segmental reporting 44.4 7.0 54.2 
Primary statement issues 
Revenue recognition 31.0 6.0 53.8 
Exceptional items 21.8 9.2 52.6 
Share based payments 44.0 4.6 48.4 
Retirement or other employee benefits 36.7 3.7 43.8 
Property, plant and equipment 46.7 4.2 24.1 
Leases  49.0 6.3 19.3 
Intangible assets / goodwill 22.7 6.0 60.0 
Financial instruments  37.3 3.3 42.6 
Inventories 38.8 4.3 23.3 
Liabilities/provisions  25.7 4.2 52.4 
Contingent assets and liabilities 29.2 3.6 27.5 
Deferred tax assets / liabilities 39.1 5.5 50.8 
Equity / debt classification 49.2 4.9 12.3 
Other accounting issues 
Presentation of  the primary fin’l 
stmts 
35.2 7.0 59.8 
Post balance sheet events 43.3 4.7 25.5 
Prior year adjustments 28.3 7.1 19.9 
Related party transactions 49.4 2.4 16.7 
Going concern 20.7 5.8 24.3 
Fraud and illegal acts 17.2 6.0 23.3 
Business Review 32.1 5.1 55.0 
Substance over form / true and fair 
view 
29.4 5.9 3.4 
Compliance & regulatory 
Maintenance of proper accounting 
records 
40.5 6.0 16.8 
Directors’ remuneration report 38.9 8.9 40.8 
Statements in the annual report 
concerning compliance with the 
Combined Code on CG 
21.5 9.6 35.5 
Matters arising from compliance  with 
the Companies Acts and  accounting 
standards not covered above  
30.8 9.6 10.4 
Requirements of listing rules 
prescribed by the Financial Services 
Authority 
45.8 9.6 16.7 
Total (%) 35.3 6.0 34.2 
Total (No. of issues) 1923 327 5445 
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Note to table: 
1. ACC = audit committee chair; CFO = finance director; AP = audit partner.
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Table 7: Groupings Involved in Discussions for Sub-samples – Combined Sample 
(n=498) 
 Grouping (%) 
Sub-group No AC or 
ACC 
ACC no 
AC 
No AP 
or AC 
No CFO All in No AC No AP 
Panel (a)
Company size: 
FTSE 350 32.2 4.7 5.3 2.1 57.6 36.8 10.6 
Non-FTSE 
350 
40.9 8.5 11.4 1.1 42.7 49.3 17.3 
2  41.1*** 31.0*** 65.9*** 7.3** 110.8*** 80.1*** 49.8*** 
Panel (b)
Auditor tier: 
Big Four 35.2 5.8 7.7 2.3 52.8 41.0 13.2 
Non-Big Four 38.1 7.9 7.0 1.5 45.3 46.0 14.2 
2  2.0 4.0** 0.3 1.7 12.0*** 5.5** 0.5 
Notes to table: 
2. ACC = audit committee chair; CFO = finance director; AP = audit partner.
3. * = significant at 10% level; ** = significant at 5% level; *** = significant at 1% level. 
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Appendix 
Panel (a): By company size 
Parties 
involved 
FTSE 350 Non-FTSE 350 
 No. % Rank No. % Rank 
CFO only 155 4.4 4 198 10.1 4 
AP only 30 0.8  2 0.1  
ACC only 1 0.0  4 0.2  
AC only 30 0.8  6 0.3  
CFO + AP 939 26.7 2 609 31.0 1 
CFO + ACC 28 0.8  23 1.2 8 
CFO + AC 90 2.6 6 60 3.0 6 
AP + ACC 2 0.1  1 0.1  
AP + AC 7 0.2  4 0.2  
ACC + AC 2 0.1  2 0.1  
CFO+AP+ACC 130 3.7 5 139 7.1 5 
CFO+AP + AC 556 15.8 3 292 14.8 3 
CFO+ACC+AC 65 1.8 7 52 2.6 7 
AP + ACC +AC 3 0.1  5 0.3  
All 4 1482 42.1 1 569 28.9 2 
Total 3520 100.0  1966 100.0 
Panel (b): By audit firm tier 
Parties 
involved 
Big Four Non Big Four 
 No. % Rank No. % Rank 
CFO only 327 6.6 4 29 4.6 6 
AP only 32 0.7  0 0.0  
ACC only 5 0.1  0 0.0  
AC only 37 0.8  1 0.2  
CFO + AP 1356 27.5 2 206 32.6 1 
CFO + ACC 40 0.8  13 2.1 7 
CFO + AC 126 2.6 6 34 5.4 4= 
AP + ACC 4 0.1  0 0.0  
AP + AC 32 0.7  3 0.5  
ACC + AC 4 0.1  0 0.0  
CFO+AP+ACC 235 4.8 5 34 5.4 4= 
CFO+AP + AC 749 15.2 3 106 16.8 3 
CFO+ACC+AC 107 2.2 7 10 1.6 8 
AP + ACC +AC 2 0.0  6 0.9  
All 4 1861 37.8 1 189 29.9 2 
Total 4917 100.0  631 100.0 
Note to tables: 
1. ACC = audit committee chair; CFO = finance director; AP = audit partner.
